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Defining Fetal Life: An Establishment Clause Analysis of 
Religiously Motivated Informed Consent Provisions 
JUSTIN R. OLSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
If a woman wants to get an abortion in the state of Indiana, she has to hear 
several things from her physician at least eighteen hours before the procedure. She 
will hear a list of the medical risks associated with an abortion, including “the risk 
of infection and hemorrhage; the potential danger to a subsequent 
pregnancy; . . . the potential danger of infertility”1 and “[t]he probable gestational 
age of the fetus at the time the abortion is to be performed.”2 Her physician must 
also tell her a variety of non-medical facts: that the state provides benefits for 
prenatal, childbirth, and neonatal care;3 that the unborn child’s father is legally 
required to pay child support;4 and that adoptive services are available.5 She will 
also have to see “a picture or drawing of a fetus,”6 and sometime before the 
abortion, unless she refuses in writing, she will have to view an ultrasound image 
of her unborn child.7 All of these mandated disclosures are what Indiana considers 
necessary to ensure that a woman’s consent to the abortion procedure is both 
informed and voluntary.8 
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 1. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(D)(i)–(iii) (2012). 
 2. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(F). 
 3. See § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(2)(A) (stating that the benefits may be available from the 
“division of family resources”). 
 4. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(2)(B). This clause also notes that “[i]n the case of rape, the 
information required under this clause may be omitted.” Id. 
 5. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(2)(C). 
 6. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(F)(i). 
 7. § 16-34-2-1.1(b). 
 8. Certain disclosures mandated by states are more controversial than others. While 
abortion is a contested moral issue, it is also a medical procedure that presents real risk of 
physical harm to expecting mothers, such as “the risk of infection and hemorrhage.” § 16-34-
2-1.1(a)(1)(D)(i). A risk of infection is less controversial than information on fetal pain, 
photographs of the fetus at different stages of development, the link between breast cancer 
and abortion, and the purported effects of an abortion on the mental health of the mother. See 
Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate 
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 15–25 (2012); see also Harper 
Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and 
Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 143 (2008) (discussing fetal pain statutes). 
Some scholars have argued that requiring such controversial disclosures are at odds with 
traditional informed consent doctrine, Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double 
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The U.S. Supreme Court permits states to fully inform women of the 
consequences of an abortion provided that what they require the doctors to say is 
“truthful,” “non-misleading,” and relevant to the abortion procedure.9 This standard 
                                                                                                                 
Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2008) (arguing 
that disclosure laws aimed at discouraging abortions “are inconsistent with the values that 
support the traditional informed consent doctrine”); Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: 
Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 228 
(2009) (arguing that “abortion law, although invoking ‘informed consent’ as a reason for 
abortion restrictions, has diverged far from the law of informed consent.”), because the 
disclosures interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, diverge from informed consent’s 
foundational values of autonomy and self-determination, and are based on conceptions of 
women as inherently mentally unstable. Evelyn Atkinson, Abnormal Persons or Embedded 
Individuals?: Tracing the Development of Informed Consent Regulations for Abortion, 34 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 617, 618–20 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“The current perversion of 
informed consent doctrine in the abortion context, which is focused on the mental health 
effects of abortion rather than the right to bodily autonomy or self-determination, is the 
result of a framework that has developed from entrenched conceptions of women both as 
mothers and as mentally unstable.”); Manian, supra, at 224–27; Reva B. Siegel, The New 
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1030–36 (arguing that regulations that restrict abortion are based on 
paternalistic views of women’s capacity for decision-making); Amanda McMurray Roe, 
Note, Not-So-Informed Consent: Using the Doctor-Patient Relationship to Promote State-
Supported Outcomes, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 205, 207 (2009) (arguing that “there is no 
place for medically unfounded statutes that interfere with the doctor-patient relationship by 
posing as requirements for informed consent”); cf. Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: 
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 
DUKE L.J. 1641, 1689 (2008) (“I am prepared to argue that [antiabortion regulations that 
purport to protect women] violate[] forms of dignity and decisional autonomy guaranteed to 
women, not only by Roe and Casey, but also by the Supreme Court’s equal protection sex 
discrimination cases.”). Other scholars, however, are hesitant to quickly condemn 
controversial disclosures on traditional informed consent grounds. Nadia N. Sawicki, The 
Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 5 (2011) (“This Article contends that when viewed as a whole, the doctrine of informed 
consent does not impose nearly as significant a barrier to abortion disclosure laws as many 
critics claim.”). This Note does not take a position on whether such controversial disclosures 
violate certain principles of informed consent beyond recognizing the legitimacy of court 
decisions that have upheld these controversial disclosures against legal challenge. E.g., 
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); 
Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 794 F. Supp. 
2d 892 (S.D. Ind. 2011). See generally infra Part III. The purpose of this Note is not to 
support or disaffirm the merits of these mandated disclosures but to discuss the 
Establishment Clause implications of such disclosures that may have been motivated by 
religious beliefs. 
 9. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 
(1992) (plurality opinion) (“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional 
violation when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, 
nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and 
those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go too far, are 
inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are 
overruled.”). Traditional informed consent doctrine requires five elements to be present in 
order for the informed consent to occur: competence of the patient to understand and decide; 
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is based upon the recognition that a state may inform a woman of the potential risks 
and consequences associated with the procedure10 and must ensure the autonomy of 
a woman’s decision.11 At the same time, the Supreme Court tailored informed 
consent in the abortion context12 to interests unique to that setting by holding that a 
state may use informed consent to communicate its profound respect for fetal life13 
and declare its preference for childbirth over abortion.14 
                                                                                                                 
disclosure of information material to the procedure; understanding of such disclosure; 
voluntariness of the patient in deciding; and consent, that is a decision in favor of a plan and 
the patient’s authorization of the chosen plan. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 79–80 (5th ed. 2001). 
 10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
 11. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 78–79 (“An informed consent is an 
individual’s autonomous authorization of a medical intervention . . . .” (emphasis in 
original)); Vandewalker, supra note 8, at 5 (“The fundamental value undergirding the 
doctrine [of informed consent] is generally considered to be patient autonomy.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 8, at 620 (characterizing informed consent in the 
abortion context as a “perversion of informed consent doctrine”). But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 
884 (plurality opinion) (“On its own, the doctor-patient relation [in the abortion context] is 
entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a requirement that a doctor 
give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for 
constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific 
information about any medical procedure.”). 
 13. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146, 
160 (2007) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion)); see Casey, 505 U.S. at 968 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the 
“State’s legitimate interest in unborn human life”). 
 14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (plurality opinion); id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the joint opinion that the State may ‘expres[s] a 
preference for normal childbirth’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in 
original)); id. at 986 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“States 
may take sides in the abortion debate and come down on the side of life, even life in the 
unborn . . . .” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (plurality opinion)); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 933 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(“Like Justice Stevens, I agree that the State may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice 
‘is thoughtful and informed,” and that “States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable 
framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.’” 
(citations omitted)). The Court’s four conservative Justices implicitly agreed with the 
manner in which the Casey plurality articulated the state’s interests in the abortion context. 
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 968 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (Justices White, Scalia and Thomas joined the opinion). Justices Stevens 
and Blackmun appeared to agree with the plurality as well, but they were both quick to 
disagree with the plurality that a state could enact measures “designed to persuade [a 
woman] to choose childbirth over abortion” so long as the measures “are not a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–88 
(plurality opinion); id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
933 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part). Thus, it seems that all of the Justices on the Casey court agreed with the general 
proposition that a statute could, at the very least, articulate its profound respect for fetal life 
and declare its preference for childbirth over abortion so long as such articulations were not 
an attempt to persuade a woman not to choose abortion. 
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Several states have recently enacted some of the most controversial informed 
consent provisions15 to date—statutes that require a physician to tell a woman 
seeking an abortion that fetal life is human life and that abortion terminates that 
life.16 Two courts that have had the opportunity to examine such provisions—the 
Southern District of Indiana and the Eighth Circuit—have found that these new 
mandated disclosures do not violate the Supreme Court’s truthful, non-misleading, 
and relevant standard.17 
Despite these holdings, mandated disclosures that equate fetal life with human 
life have produced polarized reactions. Supporters argue that the disclosures 
describe mere scientific fact.18 Critics deny this assessment and assert that such 
provisions represent moral, ethical, ideological, or religious conclusions.19 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Some commentators do not believe that requiring a doctor to state that fetal life is 
human life and that abortion terminates that life is within a doctor’s “duty to disclose 
medically relevant information.” See, e.g., Vandewalker, supra note 8, at 26. A doctor’s duty 
to disclose does not require discussing irrelevant information, and statutes that define fetal 
life as human life are arguably irrelevant because (1) the fact is “trivially true” and obvious, 
Richard Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 954 (citation omitted) (stating that informed 
consent in its standard formulation “does not require the disclosure of a risk that ‘is either 
known to the patient or is so obvious as to justify presumption of such knowledge’”); 
Vandewalker, supra note 8, at 27, and (2) the fact is a metaphysical or ideological assertion 
and irrelevant to informed consent on that basis. Post, supra, at 954–60; Vandewalker, supra 
note 8, at 26. This Note does not take a position about whether or not defining fetal life as 
human life is inappropriate in the informed consent context beyond recognizing the 
legitimacy of court decisions that have upheld these provisions against First Amendment 
challenges. E.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of 
Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892 (S.D. Ind. 2011). See generally infra Part III. This Note’s only 
aim is the discussion of the Establishment Clause implications of legislative motivations that 
may undergird the enactment of such provisions. See supra note 8. 
 16. See, e.g., Act of May 10, 2011, P.L. 193-2011, 2011 Ind. Acts 2476, 2480 (codified 
as amended at IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (2011)) (“[H]uman physical life begins 
when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.”); H.B. 2035, ch. 44, 2011 Kansas Sess. 
Laws 598, 611 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (Supp. 2011)) 
(“[T]he abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”); 
S.B. 793, 2010 Mo. Laws 958, 959 (codified at MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.027(1)(2) (West 
2011)) (“The life of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life 
of a separate, unique, living human being.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(8)(a)(2) (Supp. 
2011) (“[A]bortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human 
being.”); H.B. 1166, ch. 186, 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws 356, 358 (codified as amended at S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2011)) (“[T]he abortion will terminate the life of a 
whole, separate, unique, living human being.”). 
 17. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724; Planned Parenthood of Ind., 794 F. Supp. 2d 892. Neither 
court reached an Establishment Clause question and each court only assessed the provisions 
to determine if the legislative definition of fetal life violated the free-speech rights of 
abortion physicians. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 733–38; Planned Parenthood of Ind., 794 F. Supp. 
2d at 913–19. 
 18. E.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 32, Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 794 F. Supp. 
2d 892 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-0630-TWP-DKL) (“[O]bjective scientific evidence plainly 
establishes that, when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm, a biological life begins.”). 
 19. E.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D.S.D. 
2005), vacated, and remanded sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 
F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The district court in Rounds, in assessing whether a South 
Dakota law requiring a physician to tell a woman seeking an abortion that a fetus was a human 
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This Note will discuss the extent to which definitions of fetal life as human life 
are religious conclusions20 and the possible Establishment Clause implications of 
such definitions. The Establishment Clause requires that legislatures refrain from 
enacting laws that advance a religious purpose.21 The Supreme Court has not found 
that abortion regulations, in general, violate the clause simply because the 
regulations coincide with a particular religious doctrine.22 But some have 
disagreed,23 and others are beginning to argue that states violate the Establishment 
Clause when they pass abortion legislation premised on the belief that fetal life is 
human life.24 This Note attempts to respond to this argument by explaining why 
statutes that define fetal life as human life do not violate the Establishment Clause. 
                                                                                                                 
being, stated the following: “Unlike the truthful, non-misleading medical and legal 
information doctors were required to disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute requires 
abortion doctors to enunciate the State’s viewpoint on an unsettled medical, philosophical, 
theological, and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus is a human being.” Id. Although this 
assessment was overruled, it represents a view that is not uncommon. See Acuna v. Turkish, 
940 A.2d 416, 425–26 (N.J. 2007); Post, supra note 15, at 954–55; Sawicki, supra note 8, at 
16 (“The problem with such disclosure requirements [that define fetal life as human life], 
many argue, is that they blur the boundary between medical information and ideological 
information.”); Jennifer Y. Seo, Raising the Standard of Abortion Informed Consent: 
Lessons to Be Learned from the Ethical and Legal Requirements for Consent to Medical 
Experimentation, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 390–91 (2011) (arguing that defining the 
fetal life as human is unethical); Vandewalker, supra note 8, at 26; Kaitlin Moredock, Note, 
“Ensuring So Grave a Choice Is Well Informed”: The Use of Abortion Informed Consent 
Laws to Promote State Interests in Unborn Life, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973, 1984 n.73 
(2010) (stating that a definition of fetal life that is incorporated into an informed consent 
provision is an extreme form of the kind of value judgments that states are allowed to make 
through their regulation of informed consent). 
 20. See generally Deanna Martin, Abortion Consent Law Before Ind. Legislature; 
Doctor Would Say Conception Begins Life, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at A10; State 
Abortion Proposal Defines Life as Beginning at Conception, HERALD-TIMES (Bloomington, 
Ind.), Feb. 12, 2006, at A12; Tim Townsend, New Mo. Abortion Law Counters Some 
Philosophy, Theology, STLTODAY.COM (Aug. 22, 2010, 12:05 AM) http://www.stltoday.
com/lifestyles/faith-and-values/new-mo-abortion-law-counters-some-philosophy-theology/
article_958b9f67-a92e-5a77-bc4d-ae780e73364c.html. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (“[A] statute [does not] violate[] the 
Establishment Clause because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some 
or all religions.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
 23. See, e.g., John Morton Cummings, Jr., Comment, The State, the Stork, and the Wall: 
The Establishment Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 
1193 (1990) (arguing that antiabortion statutes “lack a secular purpose, benefit specific 
religious organizations, unnecessarily entangle church and state, and place the state on one 
side of a political issue which is divided along religious lines, thus violating the 
establishment clause”). 
 24. See Huseina Sulaimanee, Note, Protecting the Right to Choose: Regulating 
Conscience Clauses in the Face of Moral Obligation, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 417, 431 
(2011) (“This Note argues that in order to survive Establishment Clause analysis, a statute 
regulating abortion must not promote the inherently religious idea that life begins at 
conception, must not encourage childbirth over abortion by allowing federally-funded 
facilities to deny abortion services except to save the life of a woman, and must not grant 
constitutional rights to a fetus.”). 
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The definition of fetal life is central to the abortion debate.25 And religious 
beliefs play an important role in this discussion for both ordinary individuals26 and 
state legislators.27 The significance that one assigns to fetal life—the question of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000) (“Millions of Americans believe 
that life begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death 
of an innocent child . . . .”); id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The majority views the 
procedures from the perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a 
society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending human life.”); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting in part) (“The whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls 
the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life.” (emphasis in original)); 
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 742 (8th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“In the context of abortion, the term ‘human being’ has an 
overwhelmingly subjective, normative meaning, in some sense encompassing the whole 
philosophical debate about the procedure.”); see also EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, 
AND THE COURTS: ROE V. WADE AND ITS AFTERMATH 77 (1987). 
 26. See John P. Hoffmann & Sherrie Mills Johnson, Attitudes Toward Abortion Among 
Religious Traditions in the United States: Change or Continuity?, 66 SOC. RELIGION 161, 
162 (2005); Susan V. Stromberg, Advice to a Potential Litigant: How to Challenge the 
Constitutionality of the “Choose Life” Specialty License Plate, 33 STETSON L. REV. 623, 
639–40 (2004); 35 Years After Roe Ruling, New Trends and Old Divisions, USA TODAY, 
Jan. 22, 2008, at 11A (“No matter how sincere and heartfelt the beliefs of abortion 
opponents, banning it or curtailing access still imposes one group’s religious beliefs on other 
individuals.”); supra note 20. 
  The literature discussing the relationship between abortion and religion is not 
cohesive. Laura M. Gaydos, Alexandria Smith, Carol J. R. Hogue & John Blevins, An 
Emerging Field in Religion and Reproductive Health, 49 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 473 (2010). 
One can infer that religion plays a critical role in one’s view on the issue from the 
demographics of those who support and oppose abortion. But the statistical relationship 
remains inconclusive. For example, support for the legality of abortion diminishes as church 
attendance increases; however, the relationship varies from religious group to religious 
group. ROBERT P. JONES, DANIEL COX & RACHEL LASER, COMMITTED TO AVAILABILITY, 
CONFLICTED ABOUT MORALITY: WHAT THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION TELLS US ABOUT THE 
FUTURE OF THE ABORTION DEBATE AND THE CULTURE WARS 29 (2011). Fifty-two percent of 
Americans believe that having an abortion is morally wrong. Id. at 22. Yet, the role of 
religion in determining support for and against abortion is a complicated matter. This same 
study found that “more than one-third [of] [sic] those who believe having an abortion is 
morally wrong (36%) or having an abortion is a sin (35%) also nonetheless believe having 
an abortion is in some circumstances the most responsible decision a woman can make.” Id. 
at 25. Furthermore, religious believers do not necessarily agree with their religious leaders 
on the issue. Religious News Service, Believers Hold Clear, Complicated Views on 
Abortion, NAT’L CATH. REP., June 24, 2011, at 3 (“Significant majorities of Americans say it 
is possible to disagree with their religion’s teachings on abortion and still remain in good 
standing with their faith.”). Moreover, the strength of one’s views on the issue differs based 
on a variety of other factors. Those who favor legalized abortion are more likely to give less 
importance to the issue than those who oppose legalization. Jacqueline Scott & Howard 
Schuman, Attitude Strength and Social Action in the Abortion Dispute, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 
785, 792 (1988). And women assign greater importance to the issue than men. Id. 
 27. James T. Richardson & Sandie Wightman Fox, Religious Affiliation as a Predictor 
of Voting Behavior in Abortion Reform Legislation, 11 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 347 
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when human life begins—is, for many abortion proponents and opponents, a 
function of their religious convictions or lack thereof.28 This suggests that pro-life 
legislators do not necessarily come with religiously neutral motives when they seek 
to regulate abortion.29 When those legislators collectively decide, as a 
representative assembly, to define fetal life as unmistakably human, they cannot 
help but encourage many Americans to make logical inferences about the ethical 
                                                                                                                 
(1972) (finding that religious affiliation of state legislators is a stronger indicator of voting 
behavior on abortion than constituency, party, or age); James T. Richardson & Sandie 
Wightman Fox, Religion and Voting on Abortion Reform: A Follow-Up Study, 14 J. FOR SCI. 
STUDY RELIGION 159 (1975) (same); see also supra note 20. However, a legislator’s support 
or lack thereof for abortion depends on their particular religious affiliation. Byron W. 
Daynes & Raymond Tatalovich, Religious Influence and Congressional Voting on Abortion, 
23 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 197 (1984). In particular, Catholic, Mormon, and Protestant 
legislators are “more likely to support restrictive abortion legislation after taking account of 
personal qualities such as party and ideology and the influence of the legislators’ district.” 
KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 148 (3d ed. 1997) (citing 
several studies). These studies noted above are now dated. A more recent study paints a 
much more complex relationship between abortion and religious support. See David Yamane 
& Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, Religion in the Legislative Arena: Affiliation, Salience, Advocacy, 
and Public Policymaking, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 433 (2006). In a study to determine the effect 
of religious affiliation, religious salience (the importance of religion to the individual), and 
religious group advocacy for the roll-call vote of the Wisconsin state legislature on 1995 
Assembly Bill 441 (imposing a twenty-four hour waiting period on women seeking abortions 
and enacting new informed consent procedures), the results indicated that while conservative 
Protestant identification was positively associated with pro-life voting, no religious variable 
had a significant, direct effect on abortion voting. Id. at 437–48. Party affiliation, rather, was 
the decisive factor. Id. at 449. Nonetheless, the study did indicate that “there are certainly 
religious undercurrents to th[e] issue.” Id. 
 28. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (plurality opinion) (“Men and women of good 
conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound 
moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.” 
(emphasis added)); Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
792 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“However one answers the metaphysical or theological 
question whether the fetus is a ‘human being’ . . . .” (emphasis added)); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (“One’s . . . religious training [and other life experiences]  . . . are all 
likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.” (emphasis 
added)); Rounds, 530 F.3d at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The philosophical or religious 
question of when a human life comes into existence . . . .” (emphasis added)); Acuna  v. 
Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 425–26 (N.J. 2007) (“Clearly, there is no consensus in the medical 
community or society supporting plaintiff’s position that a six- to eight-week-old embryo is, 
as a matter of biological fact—as opposed to a moral, theological, or philosophical 
judgment—‘a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable human being’ . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 99–100 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]. 
 29. See, e.g., Karen F.B. Gray, Comment, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 399 (1990) (“The issue of abortion in 
the United States has always been one that is seemingly inseparable from religion.”); Ann 
Milliken Pederson, South Dakota and Abortion: A Local Story About How Religion, Medical 
Science, and Culture Meet, 42 ZYGON 123 (2007) (discussing the role of religion in science, 
medicine, and culture in South Dakota and how that has, in part, helped to shape the state’s 
abortion legislation). 
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and moral beliefs of legislators,30 which are often based upon religious beliefs.31 
Stated differently, the interests of legislators in passing an informed consent 
provision that specifically defines fetal life as human life may significantly overlap 
with the religious interests of those individual legislators.32 One could argue that 
this overlap strongly suggests the presence of what professor Michael Perry calls 
“second-best solutions,” which are strategic acts of lawmaking that trumpet secular 
premises “aimed at making it appear that the . . . law would have been enacted even 
in the absence of the religious premises.”33 Statutes that explicitly define fetal life 
as human life are particularly troublesome for certain individuals who may suspect 
that individual legislators may not be simply legislating from an unstated moral or 
ideological premise but may instead be explicitly codifying a religious conclusion. 
Even though this conclusion about the definition of human life is stated in purely 
medical and scientific terms, some may argue that the religious influence is 
unmistakable.34 Whether this is of any constitutional significance is the primary 
question this Note seeks to answer. 
Determining how to frame definitions of fetal life as human life within 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a tall order because the doctrine has grown 
increasingly incoherent.35 The fact that the Supreme Court has rarely discussed 
abortion in terms of religion36 only compounds the difficulty. This Note seeks to 
clarify the nexus between the Establishment Clause and abortion jurisprudence by 
discussing the implications of defining fetal life as human life. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 745 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that a physician’s 
statement that abortion terminates the life of a human being “taken in isolation . . . ‘certainly 
may be read to make a point in the debate about the ethics of abortion’”) (quoting Rounds, 
530 F.3d at 735 (en banc)). 
 31. See supra notes 20, 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Daniel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare Animosity, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 125, 
132 (1999) (“Justice Stevens, in particular, has voted to invalidate legislative acts because of 
their overly cozy fit with religious dogma.” (citing Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490, 568 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 33. Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Does 
Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 673 (2001); see also 
Crane, supra note 32, at 132–33. 
 34. Sulaimanee, supra note 24, at 431. 
 35. E.g., Mark Strasser, Thou Shalt Not?, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & 
CLASS 439, 439 (2006). Professor Strasser notes: 
 Given that the different tests articulated by the Court to determine 
Establishment Clause violations do not always yield similar dictates, it would 
seem important for the Court to announce clear guidelines with respect to the 
conditions under which the different tests should be used. Regrettably, no clear 
guidelines have been forthcoming from the Court. 
 That the Court has not made clear which test to apply in which situation 
does not preclude the possibility that certain basic themes run through the 
jurisprudence. Yet, there is no agreement about what those basic themes are. 
Id. at 460. 
 36. See Justin Murray, Exposing the Underground Establishment Clause in the Supreme 
Court’s Abortion Cases, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2010). Ronald Dworkin has argued that 
abortion can be understood as a First Amendment religious issue. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW, supra note 28, at 104–10; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 160–68 (1993). 
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The foundational premise of this Note is that a rigid distinction between the 
legislative purpose37 of a statute and the personal motives of the individual 
legislators who enacted it must be maintained.38 Individuals should never view the 
personal, religious motives of legislators as an interpretive gloss on a statute that is 
facially nonreligious39 or for which a secular justification is reasonably available.40 
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that abortion regulations have a 
secular justification—they articulate traditionalist values about abortion, not merely 
religious conclusions.41 Thus, abortion regulations should only be assessed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Determining legislative purpose is a critical component of both Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, see, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864 
(2005), and certain schools of statutory interpretation. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 248–337 
(5th ed. 2009) (discussing “how external context in the sense of statutory purpose influences 
the meaning of a statute”). 
 38. Professor Richard C. Schragger notes the distinction as being between the stated 
purpose and the actual purpose. See Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the 
Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 594–95 (2011); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, 
The Continuing Relevance of the Establishment Clause: A Reply to Professor Richard C. 
Schragger, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 125, 128 (2011), available at http://www.texas
lrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Corbin-89-TLRSA-125.pdf (describing the distinction noted 
by Professor Schragger as one between “objectively determined purpose rather than actual 
purpose”). Professor Schragger argues that the Establishment Clause requires an inquiry into 
the actual purpose, that is, the actual motives of the individual legislators. See Schragger, 
supra, at 588. Thus he states that, 
[D]espite a doctrinal requirement that laws have a legitimate “secular 
legislative purpose,” the Court avoids inquiring too deeply into the actual 
provenance of legislative acts. Even if a law or government act is actually 
motivated by a particular religious constituency or religious belief, the Court 
will uphold it if it can be justified with reference to a plausible secular criteria. 
Thus, across a whole range of government policy making, religiously motivated 
decisions can be made, and the Court has little to say about it. 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). For these reasons, Schragger argues that the 
Establishment Clause is under-enforced, id. at 587, implying that the Constitution prohibits 
more than what courts are willing to enforce. This Note rejects this argument and assumes 
that the Establishment Clause requires an inquiry that is no more thorough (and perhaps less 
so) than what the Supreme Court performs in practice. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 39. See infra Part I.B.1. Attempting to discern the motives of individual legislators, or 
what some have referred to as “actual purpose”—see supra note 38—is a difficult task at 
best and dubious at worst. As Professor Caroline Mala Corbin states, 
Reliance on actual purpose would require pinpointing what counts as the actual 
purpose behind legislation passed by dozens of people, each of whom might 
have a different actual purpose. And this is assuming courts could determine 
what motivates particular legislators. Reliance on actual purpose would also 
create the dilemma of how to analyze legislation that had been passed anew 
with a different legislative history. 
Corbin, supra note 38, at 128 n.18 (citation omitted). 
 40. See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text. 
 41. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980). 
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according to their objective purpose and not the personal religious motives of those 
who enacted them. 
But are statutes that define fetal life as human life different from typical anti-
abortion regulations? This Note argues that the Establishment Clauses does not 
preclude a state from defining fetal life as human life because this definition has 
generally been a necessary premise for all legislation that may have the effect of 
discouraging abortion. Abortion is a distinctly moral issue42 that hinges, to a large 
extent, upon the definition of human life.43 While many pro-choice advocates have 
argued that the morality and legality of abortion is not contingent upon the moral 
status of the fetus,44 the vast majority of pro-life legislators consider the definition 
of fetal life as human life the starting point for their anti-abortion arguments and 
consequently a necessary premise for many anti-abortion regulations.45 Thus, if the 
definition of fetal life is a necessary premise for much anti-abortion legislation and 
if anti-abortion legislation is not considered a religious issue per se, then the 
Establishment Clause should not preclude a state from explicitly articulating that 
necessary premise. 
Part I situates these informed consent statutes within the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause doctrine, in particular the objective observer test as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 
122–23 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he justice (or injustice) of laws against abortion and 
homosexual conduct depends, at least in part, on the morality (or immorality) of those 
practices”). 
 43. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The plurality opinion in Casey] describes the methodology 
of Roe, quite accurately, as weighing against the woman's interest the State's ‘important and 
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.’ But ‘reasoned judgment’ does 
not begin by begging the question, as Roe and subsequent cases unquestionably did by 
assuming that what the State is protecting is the mere ‘potentiality of human life.’ The whole 
argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and what others call the 
unborn child is a human life.” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 974) (emphasis in original)); see 
also supra note 25. 
 44. E.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of 
Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990) (arguing that even if a fetus is a person (and 
consequently a human being), forcing a woman to carry a fetus to term is a form of servitude 
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment); Margaret Olivia Little, Abortion, Intimacy, and 
the Duty to Gestate, 2 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 295, 299 (1999) (arguing that 
abortion does not hinge only upon weighing a fetus’s “right to life” against a woman’s right 
to choose, but also upon the relationship that exists between a woman and her fetus—
whether that relationship is strong enough to create a duty to gestate and allow the fetus to 
occupy her womb); Soran Reader, Abortion, Killing, and Maternal Moral Authority, 
HYPATIA, Jan.–Mar. 2008, at 132, 144, 148) (arguing that motherhood, not the fact of 
conception itself, “confers moral authority on the mother as [the] creator” of personhood and 
that she alone can determine whether or not to bring the fetus into the world); Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (1971) (arguing that even if a fetus is 
a person, it does not follow that a woman must give aid to the fetus by carrying it to term); 
see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 257 (1993) (“[T]he conclusion of fetal humanity 
by no means ends the argument; it simply forces the striking of a balance.”). 
 45. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 982; see also Little, supra note 44, at 297–98. 
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articulated in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky46 along with the limits that 
test presents in determining the subjective motives of individual legislators. This 
Part also discusses the various approaches that scholars have used to determine the 
extent to which religious motivations are permissible in lawmaking. Part II 
describes the contours of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence in order to 
demonstrate the precise secular purposes that a state may advance in the abortion 
context. Part III examines the informed consent provisions of South Dakota and 
Indiana, two states that require physicians to inform a woman seeking an abortion 
that she will be aborting a human being. This discussion illustrates how courts 
generally accept the claim of state legislatures that statutes that define fetal life do 
not articulate anything beyond a scientific conclusion that fetal life is human life. 
Part IV applies the conclusions of the previous Parts to the statutes at issue and 
argues that the Establishment Clause does not preclude informed consent 
provisions that define fetal life as human life. 
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE SECULAR PURPOSE PRONG 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to require that a 
state legislature act only on the basis of a secular purpose.47 Distinguishing a 
secular purpose from a religious one is, thus, a threshold question. Unfortunately, 
this inquiry is complicated by the fact that many statutes articulate facially secular 
purposes but are enacted by legislators who are motivated by their religious beliefs. 
Anti-abortion legislation is a prime example of the kind of legislation for which 
religious beliefs impact voting by legislators.48 The influence of religion in the civil 
rights movements is another example of how religion can drastically influence the 
political process.49 And yet, as noted below, the Supreme Court has held the 
overlap between religious beliefs and the purpose of a piece of legislation does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.50 This means that it is possible to distinguish a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 47. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 48. WALD, supra note 27, at 148. See generally supra notes 20, 26–27. 
 49. See DAVIS W. HOUCK & DAVID E. DIXON, RHETORIC, RELIGION AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1954–65 (2006) (demonstrating the centrality of religious belief to the 
civil rights movement); Johnny E. Williams, Linking Beliefs to Collective Action: Politicized 
Religious Beliefs and the Civil Rights Movement, 17 SOC. F. 203, 218 (2002) (arguing “that 
culture, particularly religious culture, has a direct and independent role in facilitating 
collective action,” in particular, the civil rights movement); Charles Marsh, 6 POL. 
THEOLOGY 266, 266 (2005) (reviewing DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC 
RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW (2004)) (“[David Chappell] argues that the [civil 
rights] movement’s vitality was a result of ‘the prophetic religious tradition’ out of which it 
grew, rather than the secular liberal tradition, which floundered on civil rights.”). 
 50. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319–20 (1980); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 
U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our cases in no way imply that the 
Establishment Clause forbids legislators merely to act upon their religious convictions. We 
surely would not strike down a law providing money to feed the hungry or shelter the 
homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the 
funds would not have been approved. Also, political activism by the religiously motivated is 
part of our heritage. Notwithstanding the majority’s implication to the contrary we do not 
1124 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1113 
 
secular purpose from the unstated religious motives of the legislators.51 This Part, 
beginning with a brief discussion of Establishment Clause doctrine, argues that the 
distinction between legislative purpose on the one hand and personal motivation of 
the legislator on the other best explains why the Supreme Court has not struck 
down religiously influenced legislation in the abortion context.52 
A. The Lemon Test and the Endorsement Test—The Objective Observer Inquiry 
The Supreme Court has articulated two doctrinal tests to apply the mandate of 
the Establishment Clause.53 The Court formulated the first test in Lemon v. 
                                                                                                                 
presume that the sole purpose of a law is to advance religion merely because it was 
supported strongly by organized religions or by adherents of particular faiths. To do so 
would deprive religious men and women of their right to participate in the political process. 
Today’s religious activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act, but yesterday’s resulted 
in the abolition of slavery, and tomorrow’s may bring relief for famine victims.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 51. See CARTER, supra note 44, at 111 (stating that some courts mistake “the political 
purpose for which the statute is enacted with the religious sensibilities of legislators or their 
constituents”); Scott W. Breedlove & Victoria S. Salzmann, The Devil Made Me Do It: The 
Irrelevance of Legislative Motivation Under the Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 
419, 422 (2001) (“Despite the courts’ emphasis on motivation, only the effect of a law and 
the objective governmental interest in that law should be considered in determining whether 
it violates Establishment Clause prohibitions.” (emphasis omitted)); Scott C. Idleman, 
Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 23 (2002) (“To summarize, the legislative utilization of religious premises 
categorically transgresses neither the requirement that there be a secular purpose nor the 
alternative prohibition on having the (primary) purpose of advancing religion, as long as the 
statute in question is today intended to achieve a temporal objective otherwise within the 
delegated or police power of the government.” (emphasis added)); Andrew Koppelman, 
Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 117 (2002) (“A purpose inquiry need not look to 
subjective motives; one can instead attempt to discern the objective purpose of the statute—
the purpose that plainly appears from an examination of the face of the statute.”); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 803 (1993) (“But if a statute 
motivated by religion, or even intended to advance religion, is neutral in its effects on 
freedom of religious exercise and nonexercise, the Establishment Clause supplies no 
justification for outlawing it.”); Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in 
the Body Politic, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191, 194 
(James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991) (“The Establishment Clause test of 
‘impermissible purpose’ cannot sensibly mean ‘impermissible motive’ in a strong 
sense . . . .”). 
 52. Steven L. Skahn presented this same issue with regard to regulations that restrict 
abortion. Steven L. Skahn, Note, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First Amendment, 
14 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 501 (1980). Skahn’s negative answer to this question was relatively 
inconclusive and requires further examination, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent holdings in Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (holding that a court may inquire beyond the 
stated purpose of a statute to identify an impermissible religious purpose) and McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that a court may examine the 
stated purpose of the legislature from the perspective of an objective observer, not just the 
language of the statute on its face). 
 53. A third test, the coercion test, is sometimes used by the Court to assess 
Establishment Clause claims. This test is triggered when an individual claims to have 
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Kurtzman,54 which reads as follows: “First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion.’”55 This test requires that the government 
ensure equality among particular religions and between religion and irreligion in 
both form and substance.56 
The Court has adopted another test, commonly referred to as the endorsement 
test.57 Justice O’Connor first articulated the endorsement test in her concurring 
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,58 by stating that “[t]he proper inquiry under the 
purpose prong of Lemon . . . is whether the government intends to convey a 
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion”59 and that the proper inquiry 
under the effect prong of Lemon is “that a government practice not have the effect 
of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion”60 either “intentionally or unintentionally.”61 The Court applies the effect 
prong by asking whether an “objective observer” would perceive that a 
government’s message amounted to an endorsement of religion.62 In most 
Establishment Clause cases, the Court generally applies both the Lemon test and the 
endorsement test as a “unitary inquiry.”63 However, the endorsement test performs 
much of the heavy lifting when government communication plays a critical role in 
the state action in question.64 
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky65 provides a recent example of how the 
Court applies both of these tests as a unitary inquiry. It also demonstrates how the 
Court has essentially melded the purpose prong into the effects prong under this 
                                                                                                                 
suffered undue pressure to endorse a particular religion or religion in general. See KENT 
GREENAWALT, 2 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 191 
(2008) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS]. This test is largely 
concerned with the government’s interference with religious voluntarism, DANIEL O. 
CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 129 (2009), which makes it less 
helpful when analyzing legislative purpose and motivation. Also, while informed consent 
provisions may in one sense coerce a physician into articulating a view of fetal life with 
which she does not agree, analyzing such coercion does not play a large role in assessing the 
legislative purpose. 
 54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 55. Id. at 612–13 (citation omitted). See generally GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND 
FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 158–80. 
 56. See CONKLE, supra note 53, at 122–24. 
 57. See id. at 125. 
 58. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 59. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Professor Dan Conkle summarizes the test as 
follows: “[T]he government violates the Establishment Clause if it intends to communicate a 
message that endorses religion (either one religion or religion generally) or if, whatever the 
government’s intention, its action has the effect of communicating such a message.” 
CONKLE, supra note 53, at 125. 
 61. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 63. CONKLE, supra note 53, at 155. 
 64. See GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 182–83. 
 65. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
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unitary Lemon/endorsement analysis. In McCreary, the Supreme Court found that 
McCreary County had violated the Establishment Clause when it erected a Ten 
Commandments display in the county courthouse.66 The Supreme Court analyzed 
the predominate purpose of installing the display through the eyes of an objective 
observer. The Court stated that “[t]he eyes that look to purpose belong to an 
‘objective observer,’” and that this observer takes account of the traditional external 
signs that show up in the “text, legislative history, and implementation of the 
statute,” or comparable official act.67 Analytically, this meant the Court had melded 
the first two prongs of the Lemon test into one single inquiry in which the purpose 
of the legislature is now judged by the effect of its legislative action as seen through 
the eyes of an objective observer.68 
The practical consequence of this melding is that the Supreme Court now looks 
beyond the facial actions of legislatures and engages in a broader, more nuanced 
inquiry of the substantive meaning of a particular legislative action. The Court 
effectuates this more substantive analysis by using the objective observer standard 
to incorporate additional, relevant factors beyond a legislature’s facial purpose as 
explicated in a statute.69 The practical effect of this test may be less expansive than 
one might imagine at first, given the limited instances in which the Court has struck 
down government action for violating the purpose prong.70 Nonetheless, this is the 
manner in which the Court has articulated the secular purpose requirement at 
present. 
The extent of this more nuanced inquiry described in McCreary hinges upon just 
who this objective observer is. Justice O’Connor has described the objective 
observer as “a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, 
determined by the [collective] social judgment.”71 Thus, the observer is not 
necessarily the reasonable religious skeptic or believer, nor is she any person who 
may think that a certain government act could be an endorsement of religion.72 Nor 
is the objective observer standard about the “actual perception of individual 
observers.”73 Rather, the objective observer is a person who comprehends the true 
meaning of the government action in question. She is educated and informed, and is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Id. at 851–58. The Court did not hold that a sacred text could never be integrated 
into a government display, but only that such texts must be sufficiently integrated with other 
non-religious documents and materials so that “there is no risk that [such sacred materials] 
would strike an observer as evidence that the . . . [g]overnment was violating neutrality in 
religion.” See id. at 874. 
 67. Id. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See CONKLE, supra note 53, at 179. 
 70. See Schragger, supra note 38, at 594. 
 71. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 72. But see CONKLE, supra note 53, at 179 (interpreting McCreary as reflecting “a 
concern for the symbolic impact of the government’s action, especially on dissenters, who 
may be affronted and alienated if the government appears to be endorsing religious beliefs 
they do not share”). 
 73. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779. 
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aware of the history of the government’s action, the context in which it occurs, and 
the reasons for it.74 Defined in this way, the objective observer analysis takes the 
Establishment Clause analysis beyond a formal assessment of the discrete acts of 
the legislature by incorporating a more thorough inquiry of the substantive meaning 
of those acts. 
When analyzing informed consent provisions, the endorsement analysis of the 
dual Lemon/endorsement test becomes particularly important. Informed consent 
provisions represent a special kind of medical regulation that requires the 
government to “communicate” a distinct message that is truthful, non-misleading, 
and relevant to the procedure.75 Moreover, based upon the Court’s reasoning in 
McCreary, a court may analyze a legislature’s purpose for enacting a particular 
informed consent provision based upon the effects of that purpose as seen through 
the eyes of an objective observer.76 This means that one must look beyond the 
merely biological language of definitions of fetal life and situate them within their 
broader legal context. Whether this analysis must go so far as to incorporate 
popular perceptions of the religious motives of legislatures is a question that the 
Supreme Court has not fully addressed. 
B. Religious Purposes Versus Religious Motives 
The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated whether a legislative purpose 
refers only to the objective end for which a statute is passed or whether it includes 
the subjective motivation of individual legislators.77 This Note refers to the 
objective end of a piece of legislation as the “purpose” and the subjective 
motivations and reasons of legislators for enacting it as the “motivation” or 
“motives.”78 Understanding the role of legislative motivation is critical in the 
abortion context because of the distinctly moral and religious nature of the issue. 
While regulating abortion through informed consent is not a religious purpose,79 
religious motivations can overlap significantly with the purpose of informed 
consent laws in the abortion context.80 In light of this overlap, state legislators who 
seek to regulate abortion heavily may be advancing legitimate secular purposes but 
may be doing so because of clandestine religious motives.81 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See Kirsten K. Wendela, Note, Context Is in the Eye of the Beholder: Establishment 
Clause Violations and the More-Than-Reasonable Person, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 987 
(2005). 
 75. See GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 182–83. 
 76. See CONKLE, supra note 53, at 179. 
 77. See GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 164. But see 
e.g., Breedlove & Salzmann, supra note 51, at 422 (“Despite the courts’ emphasis on 
motivation, only the effect of a law and the objective governmental interest in that law 
should be considered in determining whether it violates Establishment Clause prohibitions.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 78. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 79. See infra Part II. 
 80. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 81. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 30 (1988) 
[hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS] (“Religious convictions of the sort 
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Distinguishing between religious purposes and motives is particularly relevant 
when applying the objective observer inquiry noted above. One can imagine certain 
instances in which a state legislature enacts a particular law for which there exists a 
facially secular purpose. An objective observer may even find that this secular 
purpose does not have the effect of advancing a particular religion in and of itself.82 
However, if an objective observer were to look underneath the stated purpose of the 
legislature and examine the reasons for which a legislature passed a law, she may 
very well identify a religious motivation. It may be reasonable for this observer to 
then find that this motivation so contaminates the law that the observer is forced to 
question the genuineness of the secular purpose articulated by the legislator. In 
light of this possibility, it is tempting to conclude that the Court in McCreary 
articulated this very concern when it explained, “although a legislature’s stated 
reasons will generally get deference, the secular purpose required has to be 
genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”83 As 
explained below, however, the Court in McCreary was concerned only with 
adopting a test to discern hidden, objective purposes of the legislature not hidden, 
subjective motives of individual legislators. 
1. Applying McCreary: Foreclosing an Inquiry into Subjective Motive 
The mere fact that one can distinguish between motive and purpose does not 
mean that courts can necessarily identify both with equal certainty. Courts are 
accustomed to identifying legislative purpose. The purpose can be derived from the 
text84 or is often stated in a statute’s preamble.85 When the purpose is not clear from 
the text86 or if a literal interpretation of the text would lead to absurd results,87 
judges may be willing to engage in a broader analysis by referencing committee 
reports, looking at previous versions of a bill, or assessing the historical and 
political landscape in which the statute was written.88 Judges have even been 
willing to identify a broader, more general social aim of a particular piece of 
                                                                                                                 
familiar in this society bear pervasively on people’s ethical choices, including choices about 
laws and government policies.”); see also WALD, supra note 27, at 287 (“Although abortion 
cannot be reduced to an exclusive Catholic issue, the most active opponents of liberalization 
[of abortion] have indeed been recruited from the Catholic community.”). See generally 
supra notes 20, 26–27. 
 82. See CONKLE, supra note 53, at 179. 
 83. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005). 
 84. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (stating the 
purpose of the Act). 
 85. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is, of 
course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the 
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and 
of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (“[I]n 
rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.”). 
 88. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 538–44; see also POPKIN, supra note 37, at 
95–96. 
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legislation from which the court can reason in order to apply a statute to 
unanticipated situations.89 
But courts are ill-equipped to uncover the motives of individual legislators.90 
The only tools available to judges are the text or sources external to the minds and 
psyches of the legislators. As Professor Reed Dickerson stated: 
 Whether we search for actual legislative purpose or for actual 
legislative intent, we can infer it only from external materials. 
Unfortunately, in the ascertainment of legislative purpose, it cannot 
always be assumed that there is in fact such a purpose or, if there is, 
that there is reliable evidence of it. For most state legislatures, there is 
only the statute and the backdrop of proper context. The statute 
normally includes no preamble or purpose clause, and there is little 
recorded legislative history. Even where they exist, there is no 
assurance that either will be relevant.91 
The danger in attempting to discern subjective motive in the absence of much 
external evidence is that a judge may impose a motive that is not really there.92 
Others have noted the difficult and dubious task of attempting to discern legislative 
motives.93 
The challenge that judges face in discerning legislative motive largely explains 
why the Supreme Court in McCreary assessed the legislative purpose of the 
government action by resorting to an analysis of its effects as seen through the eyes 
of an objective observer. This objective observer inquiry, while no less abstract, is 
an attempt by the Court to add more external material by which a court can 
meaningfully identify a clandestine religious purpose underlying a stated secular 
purpose.94 Yet, as Justice Scalia noted in his McCreary dissent, this implies that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See POPKIN, supra note 37, at 84, 248–50. 
 90. See Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 860–61 
(criticizing the majority in McCreary for oversimplifying the process of discerning 
legislative intent). 
 91. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 92 (1975). 
 92. Cf. id. 
 93. See Corbin, supra note 38, at 128 n.18; Hasen, supra note 90, at 860–61. See 
generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). Chief Justice Warren stated the following 
about the difficulty of discerning legislative motive in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 383–84 (1968) (footnote omitted): 
 Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. 
When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to 
statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, 
because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought 
sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress’ purpose. It is entirely a 
different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled 
criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of 
Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech 
about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and 
the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. 
 94. See Koppelman, supra note 51, at 118. 
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constitutional wrong is no longer the “actual purpose of government action, but the 
‘purpose apparent from government action.’”95 The object of inquiry is not the 
actual, subjective motive of a legislator, but that legislator’s apparent purpose as 
seen through the eyes of an objective observer. The majority in McCreary 
explicitly acknowledged this when Justice Souter stated: 
[A]n understanding of official objective emerges from readily 
discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's 
heart of hearts. The eyes that look to purpose belong to an “‘objective 
observer,’” one who takes account of the traditional external signs that 
show up in the “‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the 
statute,’” or comparable official act.96 
Thus, the majority acknowledged that judges cannot directly discern subjective 
motive, and any inquiry that is possible is only concerned with “apparent” purpose 
based upon external material, whether the text or otherwise.97 
Apart from the inherent impossibility of discerning the actual, subjective 
motives of individual legislators, the Supreme Court has not struck down 
government action for violating the purpose prong unless the action involved a 
religious practice or religious doctrine.98 This only strengthens the conclusion that 
the religious motives of individual legislators do not even enter the discussion 
unless the government action at issue involves some kind of religious subject-
matter on its face.99 This result is understandable; otherwise, the Establishment 
Clause would require an absurd inquiry into the legislative motives of non-facially 
religious government action that was nonetheless inspired by a compassionate 
disposition toward humanity, such as laws providing relief to the poor and 
hungry100 or eliminating racial discrimination.101 Purging such morally sound 
legislation of religious influence would be impossible and wrong.102 
In sum, the McCreary analysis does not mandate an inquiry into the actual 
motives of individual legislators because the motives themselves are not detectable 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 96. Id. at 862 (citations omitted). 
 97. See id.; see also Koppelman, supra note 51, at 118. 
 98. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881 (Ten Commandments display case); Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–09 (2000) (school prayer case); Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 586–94 (1987) (creationism case); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56–61 
(1985) (school prayer case); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (Ten Commandments 
display case). See generally Schragger, supra note 38, at 593–95. The Court held that an 
antievolution statute lacked a secular purpose in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), 
but this was decided before the Lemon test was articulated. This case can be viewed as a 
creationism case. 
 99. See Schragger, supra note 38 at 595 (stating that the Court only enforces the secular 
purpose prong when the religious “intent is clear on the face of the law”). 
 100. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 101. See supra note 49. 
 102. See CARTER, supra note 44, at 112–14. 
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by courts, and to require their categorical prohibition would be hopelessly 
unenforceable in practice.103 
2. When Religious Motives are Impermissible (In Theory) 
Despite the fact that religious motives are not an object of direct inquiry for 
Establishment Clause purposes and cannot be detected in practice, scholars have 
nonetheless identified unconstitutional legislative motives by referencing 
background principles that undergird the “spirit” of the Establishment Clause. 
Professor Kent Greenawalt describes this kind of unconstitutionality as follows: 
The Constitution may actually prohibit certain actions that courts will 
not declare to be unconstitutional. . . . [This kind] of unconstitutionality 
may be raised . . . when individual legislators rely inappropriately on 
religious bases of judgment. Arguably, such reliance is itself at odds 
with constitutional premises whether or not it is discoverable by courts 
and whether or not the grounds on which individual legislators vote 
infect the validity of adopted statutes.104 
Although actual religious motives are impossible to detect in practice, discussing 
the precise motives upon which legislators may theoretically act is nonetheless 
useful for fleshing out the true extent to which legislators may rely on religious 
motives in theory. By defining the very outer limit of constitutionality, one can 
more firmly identify what kinds of religious motives (if any) are impermissible in 
principle and which ones are not. 
There are two basic approaches to defining the limits of legislative motive. The 
first approach holds that there is no limit.105 Professor Michael Perry argues that the 
Establishment Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not preclude the 
government from acting on the basis of a religiously grounded moral belief at all.106 
He argues that precluding religious motivation would result in “‘second best’ 
solutions” by the legislator—using secular purposes as mere pretexts.107 
Furthermore, he argues that it is inappropriate to invite the judiciary to substitute its 
own moral or secular values for those of the legislator.108 Most importantly, Perry 
argues that precluding religious motivation would violate the equal citizenship of 
religious believers.109 It would be unfair to allow the secularly motivated to act with 
sincerity and conviction while forcing the religiously motivated to abandon their 
theological authenticity. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. See supra note 51. 
 104. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 81, at 8. 
 105. See CARTER, supra note 44, at 111–14; Breedlove & Salzmann, supra note 51, at 
422; Perry, supra note 33, at 671. 
 106. Perry, supra note 33, at 671. 
 107. Id. at 673. 
 108. Id. at 674–75. 
 109. See id. at 675. For a thorough explanation of the equality of citizenship rationale, see 
Idleman, supra note 51, at 72–78. 
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The second approach holds that legislators may appeal to religious motives so 
long as a reasonable, secular justification is available.110 Professor Mark Tushnet 
argues that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit an “‘impermissible motive’ 
in a strong sense.”111 Rather, a legislator is not inappropriately influenced by 
religious views when he acts on the basis of those views in such cases where an 
alternative secular ground is available.112 Tushnet defines “secular ground” as “one 
that does not make essential reference to a deity.”113 Such a definition allows the 
religiously motivated legislator to base her decisions on such religious grounds so 
long as there are others who arrive at the same conclusion by other nonreligious 
means that do not require belief in a deity. A very general example of the kind of 
rationale that does not require one to believe in a deity might simply be that “the 
policy will increase the material well-being of the society.”114 For Tushnet, this 
rationale would serve as a legitimate secular purpose. 
Professor Kent Greenawalt argues a similar approach. He frames his argument 
in terms of motives for moral legislation, requiring that a moral law enacted with 
religious motives must involve secular indicia of harm. Greenawalt states: “If 
legislation is adopted on the basis that behavior is bad, judged from a religious 
perspective, but without belief that that bad behavior causes secular harm to entities 
deserving protection, then the legislation should be held to violate the 
establishment clause.”115 In other words, other indicia of harm must exist besides a 
mere violation of purely religious principles. The rationale for Greenawalt’s rule is 
that principles of liberal political philosophy should discourage individuals from 
resorting to religious premises that contradict science and social science.116 
Nonetheless, the science and social science that may serve as a legitimate 
foundation for harm may be less than fool proof. 
For Greenawalt, the secular harm that a legislator must articulate need not rest 
upon grounds that would satisfy every religious skeptic. Greenawalt provides 
helpful guidance regarding the sources legislators may use in deciding just what is 
harmful by offering an illustration: 
Suppose it were also determined that many serious Roman Catholics 
believe . . . that the wrongness of . . . stem cell research can be 
established on nonreligious “scientific” or natural law grounds. A 
substantial number of citizens do believe the wrongness of research 
need not depend on religious convictions. Are we to label these citizens 
as dishonest or deluded, to say that their self-consciously nonreligious 
understanding doesn’t count because they have a religious 
understanding with the same import for legal regulation and we know 
that the latter drives from the former? That is not an approach that is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Tushnet, supra note 51, at 194–95. 
 111. Id. at 194. 
 112. Id. at 195. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 210. 
 115. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 81, at 247; see also 
GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 533–34. 
 116. GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS, supra note 53, at 530 n.6 (citing 
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 81, at 204–11). 
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very respectful of fellow citizens, and it is not the kind of judgment a 
court should be essaying.117 
In short, shaky science and natural law provide legitimate grounds upon which a 
religious believer may premise her belief that an immoral act will result in secular 
harm. 
In sum, the Establishment Clause requires that a state articulate a secular 
purpose for all of the legislation that it passes and that no statute may have the 
effect of advancing or endorsing religion in general or a particular religion. This 
secular purpose prong is assessed by applying an objective observer inquiry that 
determines legislative purpose based upon the effects of the law. Assessing 
religious motives assists the objective observer in spotting sham secular purposes. 
In order to avoid the appearance of a sham secular purpose, those who would argue 
that the “spirit” of the Establishment Clause limits the use of religious 
motivations—for example, Tushnet and Greenawalt—would require that 
religiously motivated officials locate either independent secular grounds or secular 
evidence of harm to justify their motives.118 
II. PERMISSIBLE SECULAR PURPOSES RECOGNIZED IN SUPREME COURT ABORTION 
CASES 
From an Establishment Clause perspective, the abortion context is a unique and 
exceptional area of jurisprudence. Some commentators have argued that the Court 
has developed its abortion jurisprudence partly by means of unstated Establishment 
Clause concerns about the particularly religious nature surrounding the definition 
of fetal life.119 The Supreme Court has articulated several state interests that are 
secular and nonreligious, which state legislatures may use to regulate the abortion 
procedure and informed consent without violating the Establishment Clause. This 
Part examines these unique secular purposes within abortion legislation. 
When the Court in Roe v. Wade120 held that substantive due process protects a 
woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion,121 the Court did not leave the 
states powerless to limit that interest. In its own words, the Court stated that the 
right to an abortion “is not absolute.”122 Rather, a state may assert and act upon at 
least two important interests before a fetus reaches the point of viability: 
safeguarding the health of the mother and protecting potential life.123 Subsequent 
decisions applying Roe have continued to recognize these state interests and have 
clarified their nature and breadth.124 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Id. at 536 (emphasis omitted). 
 118. See supra notes 112 & 115 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra note 36. 
 120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 121. Id. at 113. 
 122. Id. at 155. The Court also recognized the legitimate state interest in “maintaining 
medical standards.” Id. at 154. 
 123. Id. at 154. 
 124. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); see also 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
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In the past several years, the Court has also recognized that the fetal life that 
states are allowed to protect is more than just “potential.”125 In Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court referred to the interest as 
protecting the “life or potential life of the unborn.”126 It also referred to this interest 
as “protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child.”127 With these 
statements, the Court demonstrated that it would not continue to refer to fetal life as 
only potential, but allowed for the fact that one could consider it to be actual human 
life.128 The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart129 continued to distance itself from Roe’s 
rhetoric of characterizing fetal life as merely “potential life” by describing it as “the 
life within the woman,”130 “the life of the unborn,”131 and “infant life.”132 
Furthermore, in both Gonzales and Casey, the Court held that states could do more 
than protect such life: they could “express profound respect for the life of the 
unborn”133 rather than express profound respect for potential life. The manner in 
which the Supreme Court has referred to a fetus in these recent cases suggests that 
a state may likewise refer to a fetus not merely as potential human life but as actual 
human life. 
This interest in protecting fetal life sits alongside the additional interest of 
protecting the woman’s health, and both are used to justify informed consent 
provisions within the abortion context. Before Casey, states were required to 
remain within the scope of the traditional doctrine of informed consent,134 which 
only permitted the use of information that was medically relevant to the procedure 
itself.135 Courts consistently ruled as unconstitutional certain informed consent 
measures that might discourage a woman from choosing an abortion.136 For 
                                                                                                                 
(“The political processes of the State[s] are not to be foreclosed from enacting laws to 
promote the life of the unborn and to ensure respect for all human life and its potential. The 
State[s’] constitutional authority is a vital means for citizens to address these grave and 
serious issues, as they must if we are to progress in knowledge and understanding and in the 
attainment of some degree of consensus.”). 
 125. Martin Wishnatsky, The Supreme Court’s Use of the Term “Potential Life”: Verbal 
Engineering and the Abortion Holocaust, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 327, 342 (2012) (“From 
‘potential life,’ the Court has progressed to ‘unborn life,’ which is a significant step.”). 
 126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
 127. Id. at 846. 
 128. But see Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 426 (N.J. 2007) (citations omitted) (“In 
Casey, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly refers, when speaking of a fetus or 
embryo, to the State’s ‘interest in potential life,’ and scrupulously avoids describing either a 
fetus or an embryo as an existing human being.”). 
 129. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 130. Id. at 157. 
 131. Id. at 146. 
 132. Id. at 159. Gonzales also referred to fetal life as “her unborn child, a child assuming 
the human form.” Id. at 160. However, this was only in reference to a child aborted by 
means of intact dilation and evacuation and may not stand for the Court’s description of fetal 
life in all instances. See id. at 159–60. 
 133. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 
(1992); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). 
 134. See supra note 9. 
 135. Dresser, supra note 8, at 1606–07. 
 136. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
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example, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,137 the Court struck down an informed consent provision requiring 
that “the woman be informed by the physician of ‘detrimental physical and 
psychological effects’ and of all ‘particular medical risks.’” 138 The Court reasoned 
that this information “increase[d] the patient’s anxiety, and intrude[d] upon the 
physician’s exercise of proper professional judgment.”139 Thornburgh was later 
overruled by Casey under the rationale that the information need not address the 
physical health of the mother alone but could include her mental health as well.140 
More importantly, the Court declared that informed consent instructions did not 
have to address the woman’s health—either physical or mental—at all, but could 
serve to announce a state’s preference for childbirth over abortion.141 
The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to declare, theoretically, that a state 
may adopt a theory of when life begins. In Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services,142 the Court examined a legislative finding adopted by the Missouri 
legislature that found that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception.”143 
The statute did not by its terms specifically regulate abortion.144 Nonetheless, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the provision was unconstitutional because it circumvented 
the dictum pronounced in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.145 
that “a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation 
of abortions.”146 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s holding and 
clarified its statement in Akron. It said the “Court of Appeals misconceived the 
meaning of the Akron dictum, which was only that a State could not ‘justify’ an 
abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it 
embodied the State’s view about when life begins.”147 What the Webster dictum148 
suggests is that so long as a state’s articulation of a theory of when life begins does 
not have the effect of proscribing a woman’s right to have an abortion, substantive 
due process does not preclude the state from articulating such theories explicitly.149 
The Supreme Court’s openness to definitions of fetal life within the context of 
abortion is consistent with the Court’s statement in Harris v. McRae150 that “a 
                                                                                                                 
(1986), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 137. 476 U.S. 747. 
 138. Id. at 764 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(ii) and (iii) (1982)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
 141. See id. at 882–83. 
 142. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 143. Id. at 504 (quoting  MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (1986)). 
 144. Id. at 506. 
 145. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 146. Reprod. Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1075–77 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Akron, 462 U.S. at 444). 
 147. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506. 
 148. The Court in Webster only interpreted the meaning of the preamble itself as a “value 
judgment” favoring childbirth over abortion that did not have a legal effect upon abortion or 
medical practice. As a result, the court lacked jurisdiction to interpret its constitutional 
significance. Id. at 506–07; see infra note 150.  
 149. Id. at 506–07.  
 150. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). However, Webster does not foreclose the possibility that a 
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statute [does not] violate[] the Establishment Clause because it ‘happens to 
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’”151 In Harris, the 
Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, an appropriations rider precluding states from 
using Medicaid funds to pay for abortions (subject to a few exceptions),152 against 
an Establishment Clause challenge. The Court refused to describe the values that 
undergirded the Hyde Amendment as merely religious. Rather, the Court said the 
statute was “as much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards abortion, as it is 
an embodiment of the views of any particular religion.”153 If one reads Harris 
alongside Webster, it stands for the proposition that it is not unconstitutional for 
states to articulate theories of when human life begins because they are not stating a 
merely religious tenet but a traditionalist value about abortion. 
The Court’s distinction between religious values and traditionalist values is 
particularly important because it explains why the Court has not struck down any 
abortion regulations as violations of the Establishment Clause. The Court’s silence 
is the most persuasive indication that beliefs on the morality of abortion and the 
nature and characteristics of fetal life, even if theologically founded, are not within 
the purview of “religion” for purposes of the Establishment Clause.154 
While the Court has never defined religion outright, it has given some 
guidelines. One of the broader “definitions” of religion, found in a statute 
                                                                                                                 
definition of fetal life could cause constitutional injury. The Court was unable to make a 
ruling upon the statute because there was no possible way for the state preamble to 
materially restrict a woman’s access to an abortion, nor did it “regulate abortion or any other 
aspect of [a] medical practice.” Webster, 492 U.S. at 506–07. Without any possibility for 
constitutional injury, the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. See id. (“[T]his Court 
‘is not empowered to decide . . . abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of 
future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue 
in the case before it.’” (citing Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409 
(1900)) (alterations in original)). The Court noted that “[there] will be time enough for 
federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to restrict the 
activities of appellees in some concrete way.” Id. at 506. Inserting a theory of when life 
begins into an informed consent provision may very well lead to an allegation of concrete 
harm, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 748 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (“Under the Act a woman is given a Hobson’s choice: either to certify that she 
understands vague and ideological statements disguised as medical information or to carry 
her pregnancy to term. But ‘[a] Hobson’s choice, of this sort, is no choice at all.’ The Act’s 
procedural mandates thus likely place an undue burden on a woman’s ability to exercise her 
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.” (alterations in original) (internal citations 
omitted)), and, thereby, allow the Court to revisit the question raised in Webster. 
 151. Harris, 488 U.S. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
 152. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979) (“[N]one of the 
funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions except where the 
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such 
medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has 
been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.”). 
 153. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319. 
 154. See Skahn, supra note 52, at 508 (“A finding, though, that legislation restricting the 
funding or performance of abortion can advance religion, would require a new 
conceptualization of the prohibition against laws advancing religion. The prohibition would 
have to be expanded to include laws which do not work towards the propagation of religious 
belief.”). 
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considered in United States v. Seeger,155 would “include any ‘sincere and 
meaningful’ belief that ‘occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that 
filled by the orthodox belief in God.’”156 This definition would include deeply held 
moral beliefs157 that arguably encompass beliefs about the immorality of abortion 
or theories about when life begins. Justice Stevens applied such a broad definition 
to the Missouri preamble in his vigorous dissent in Webster. His primary concern in 
Webster was that the state’s conclusion that conception occurred at fertilization 
(rather than upon implantation on the uterine wall) was a purely theological 
conclusion, lacking any real secular purpose.158 Justice Stevens is not alone in his 
belief that the statute in Webster violated the Establishment Clause.159 However, his 
view is a minority one; and as we have seen from the discussion of Casey and its 
progeny above, the Supreme Court has only continued to expand the interests of the 
state in protecting fetal life by means of regulating abortion through informed 
consent.160 
In sum, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the states’ legitimate 
interest in protecting fetal life.161 It has even suggested that such life is not merely 
potential but actual human life.162 Furthermore, states may articulate this interest in 
the informed consent context by declaring their preference for childbirth even if 
such an articulation has no implications for the physical or mental health of the 
mother.163 Lastly, the Court has consistently failed to hold that beliefs about the 
moral status of abortion and fetal life are religious tenets or that they fit within the 
purview of a very expansive definition of religion.164 Rather, they simply represent 
traditionalist values toward abortion.165 
III. ABORTION TERMINATES HUMAN LIFE, SAY SOUTH DAKOTA AND INDIANA 
When one assesses these conclusions in light of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause doctrine, one can see that each of the interests articulated 
here serves as a legitimate secular purpose for both general abortion regulations and 
informed consent provisions. Outside of Justice Stevens’ dissent in Webster,166 the 
Court has not come close to suggesting that the motives of legislators ought to be 
assessed in order to determine whether a state is truly advancing legitimate state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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interests. This silence is deafening. Two decades after Webster, courts are still 
reluctant to ascribe much relevance to the ideological and religious motives of 
legislatures that define fetal life. The following Part discusses the two cases that 
have ruled on states’ most recent attempts to define fetal life. 
A. South Dakota 
South Dakota was the first state to define fetal life as part of a mandated 
disclosure in the context of informed consent for abortion.167 The state provision 
read as follows: 
A consent to an abortion is not voluntary and informed, unless, in 
addition to any other information that must be disclosed under the 
common law doctrine, the physician provides that pregnant woman 
with the following information . . . [t]hat the abortion will terminate the 
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.168 
In a separate provision, South Dakota defined “human being” as “an individual 
living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being 
during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.”169 
Notably, this definition was not included among the pieces of information that the 
physician was required to read to the patient.170 
Critics soon challenged the constitutionality of this statute, alleging that it 
violated free-speech rights of the physicians who were required to say that abortion 
terminated the life of a human being.171 In Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 
North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds,172 the plaintiffs (Planned Parenthood) 
argued that the notion “that from the moment of conception, an embryo or fetus is a 
‘whole, separate, unique, living human being’ . . . is not a scientific or medical fact, 
nor is there a scientific or medical consensus to that effect.”173 As a result, the 
statute required a physician to articulate a “statement[] of ideology and opinion.”174 
The First Amendment protects individuals from compelled speech, that is, state 
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action that violates an individual’s right not to speak.175 This right can only be 
overcome by a compelling government interest that is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.176 This strict scrutiny standard is satisfied in the informed consent 
context so long as the information discussed by the physician is truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant to the procedure in question.177 The Eighth Circuit in 
Rounds held that the definition of fetal life within the South Dakota provision met 
the truthful, non-misleading and relevant standard because it was strictly “biology-
based.”178 The court disagreed with Planned Parenthood’s arguments and made 
clear that the statute in no way required a physician to comment on whether the 
fetus was a “‘whole, separate, unique’ ‘human life’ in the metaphysical sense.”179 
The court referenced Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, both of which held that a 
state could use the informed consent context to express its respect for fetal life and 
that only an untruthful and misleading statement would violate the free-speech 
rights of the physician.180 It also noted that the provision was analogous to the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Gonzales that a fetus was a “living organism.”181 
Despite the court’s holding that the definition of fetal life was not ideologically 
problematic, Planned Parenthood argued that ordinary patients would misconstrue 
the meaning of a “whole, separate, unique, living human being” and not understand 
it as a strictly biological definition of fetal life.182 It argued that “patients would 
understand the plain meaning of ‘whole, separate, unique, living human being’ to 
mean a ‘person’ in the fullest moral and legal sense and that this compelled 
disclosure that a fetus or embryo is a ‘person’ would violate Roe v. Wade and its 
progeny.”183 The dissent in Rounds similarly contended that  
The medical fact that a unique set of DNA is present at conception, 
however, does not support a conclusion that the statutory adjectives 
preceding the word “human being” have scientific meaning. . . . The 
record is far from showing a medical consensus that a full set of DNA 
constitutes a “whole, separate, unique, living human being.”184 
In response, the majority stressed that South Dakota had clearly and 
satisfactorily defined the word “human being” in a separate provision.185 Because 
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this provision rested upon a purely biologically based definition of a human being 
as a “living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human 
being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full 
gestation,”186 the state had satisfied the truthful, non-misleading, and relevant 
standard. Having shown that the provision did not require a physician to articulate 
an ideological statement of mere opinion, the court held that the provision did not 
violate the Free Speech clause of the Constitution.187 
B. Indiana 
Following South Dakota’s lead, Indiana adopted a similar informed consent 
provision that required the physician to state the following: “[H]uman life begins 
when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.”188 Like the plaintiff in 
Rounds, Planned Parenthood of Indiana argued that the Indiana statute constituted 
compelled speech and, thus, violated the First Amendment free-speech rights of the 
abortion doctors.189 In Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Commissioner of the 
Indiana Department of Health, the District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana rejected the plaintiff’s argument “that classifying the fertilized egg and 
subsequent organism as a ‘human physical life’ is an ideological statement that 
goes to the heart of the abortion debate and is thus impermissible compelled 
speech.”190 The argument was almost identical to the arguments raised in 
Rounds.191 However, Planned Parenthood of Indiana had a much steeper hill to 
climb. The Indiana legislature had inserted the word “physical” in between 
“human” and “life”192 and did not include any modifying adjectives like “whole, 
separate, unique, [and] living.”193 Although there was no separate provision 
specifying that “human physical life” referred to a strictly biological definition of a 
human fetus, the district court easily concluded that the state was not making a 
metaphysical assertion by identifying a human embryo or fetus as belonging to the 
genus and species Homo sapiens.194 The court stated: 
[T]he Court recognizes that the term “human being” may refer to a 
theological, ideological designation relating to the metaphysical 
characteristics of life[;] that is not the language found before the Court 
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today. Rather, the inclusion of the biology-based word “physical” is 
significant, narrowing this statement to biological characteristics. The 
adjectives “human” and “physical” reveal that the legislature mandated 
only that the Practitioner inform the woman that at conception, a living 
organism of the species Homo sapiens is created. When the statement is 
read as a “whole” it does not require a physician to address whether 
the embryo or fetus is a “human life” in the metaphysical sense.195 
These two cases illustrate the polemical nature of definitions of fetal life. By 
deciding to alter informed consent in this manner, both South Dakota and Indiana 
were arguably motivated by their moral, metaphysical, and possibly religious, 
views on the propriety of abortion. Yet, both reaffirm the reluctance of judges to 
consider anti-abortion legislation as a religious issue. 
IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS MOTIVATIONS BEHIND 
INFORMED CONSENT PROVISIONS THAT DEFINE FETAL LIFE 
Rounds and Planned Parenthood of Indiana are not decisive examples of how a 
court would rule on the issue of the definition of fetal life. But they do provide 
clues. These clues, combined with the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause and 
abortion jurisprudence, demonstrate that informed consent provisions that define 
fetal life as human life will not be held unconstitutional because of the potentially 
religious motives of the legislators who enacted them. 
A. Secular Purposes for Defining Fetal Life in Informed Consent 
Abortion regulations, in general, do not violate the Establishment Clause for 
want of a secular purpose.196 Based upon the Court’s articulation of the several 
interests available for states that wish to regulate abortion,197 Justice O’Connor’s 
objective observer would have little difficulty recognizing that informed consent 
provisions that explicitly articulate a preference for childbirth enjoy legitimate 
recognition. Informed consent provisions, as a method for articulating the state’s 
preference for childbirth and the state’s profound respect for fetal life, at most 
represent, or at least reflect, traditionalist values toward abortion.198 The objective 
observer would, therefore, not misconstrue a childbirth-friendly informed consent 
provision as a theologically founded regulation. As a result, a typical informed 
consent provision both advances and endorses a secular purpose. 
Abortion regulations that define fetal life, on the other hand, pose a greater 
Establishment Clause concern. Justice O’Connor’s objective observer would have 
to pause for a moment and consider the South Dakota and Indiana provisions more 
thoroughly. An objective observer would recognize that the legitimate state 
interests of showing respect for fetal life and favoring childbirth do not necessarily 
rest upon a single definition of what fetal life is. Defining fetal life is not integral to 
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furthering the interests that the Court has recognized. At the very least, the 
objective observer may have lost the ability to connect South Dakota’s and 
Indiana’s legitimate purpose with a state interest explicitly articulated by the 
Supreme Court. As the dissent in Rounds stated,199 an objective observer may 
mistake the giving of informed consent for imposing a particular religious theory of 
fetal life in an arguably coercive setting. 
The concerns of the objective observer are allayed by the fact that the Supreme 
Court has steadily become more specific in the manner in which it describes fetal 
life. It no longer describes it as merely “potential” but at least acknowledges that 
one may consider fetal life as actual, human life.200 This heightened specificity 
suggests that a state is not required to remain absolutely agnostic about the nature 
of fetal life. The court in Rounds picked up on the Supreme Court’s specificity in 
defining fetal life by referencing the fact that the Court has described a fetus as a 
“living organism.”201 If the fetus is an actual organism, it only takes a small 
inference to recognize that this organism cannot belong to any other species but 
that of Homo sapiens.202 
This inference is nothing extraordinary if one takes at face value the legitimate 
interests that a state may advance in anti-abortion regulation. One of the necessary 
premises of anti-abortion legislation is that fetal life is human life and that abortion 
terminates such life; this premise has been foundational for the pro-life argument in 
general.203 The Webster dictum demonstrates how willing the Court has been to 
avoid meddling with such articulations, provided they do not restrict any other 
constitutional rights in the process.204 An objective observer would be mindful of 
this along with the implications of the Supreme Court’s “living organism” rhetoric. 
Therefore, a state should be allowed to recognize that the notion that fetal life as 
human life is a necessary premise that explains and justifies its preference for 
childbirth. A state should, therefore, be allowed to incorporate that premise into the 
informed consent context without fear of an Establishment Clause challenge. 
B. Religious Motivations in Defining Fetal Life 
While the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is enough to ensure that 
defining fetal life represents a secular purpose in practice, the South Dakota and 
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Indiana statutes may, nonetheless, be unconstitutional in principle because of the 
religious motivations upon which they may have been based. An objective observer 
is mindful of the context in which government action occurs,205 and in Indiana, 
where legislative history is not recorded, there is some evidence that religious 
motives were present.206 While Indiana was successful in passing the informed 
consent laws in question in 2010, they had previously tried in 2006.207 During the 
2006 session, one Indiana legislator stated, “[t]o put our [religious] . . . beliefs into 
a statute that’s going to be law, without being able to back it up scientifically, I 
have real hard questions about doing that.”208 Based upon this history, is it possible 
that an objector could find a purposeful endorsement of religion in principle? 
To answer to this question one need look no further than the traditionalist values 
recognized in Harris. Under the two approaches for addressing legislative 
motivations discussed above, such traditionalist values would be sufficient secular 
grounds. Professor Perry certainly would not balk at a religious motivation because 
he would never preclude a legislator from making laws on that basis. The fact that 
the Supreme Court has refused to define fetal life also correlates with Perry’s belief 
that the Court should not substitute its own view of morality in the place of the 
legislator’s view.209 Under Greenawalt’s approach,210 traditionalist values would 
seem to be equivalent to his “shaky science” or natural law basis for articulating 
secular harm. To reference his example discussing the Catholic stem cell objector, a 
legislator ought to be able to reference his traditionalist values in the same way that 
a Catholic legislator ought to be able to appeal to natural law to defend the 
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proposition that human embryos have recognizable rights that must be protected 
from harm.211 Under Tushnet’s framework, traditionalism is a secular source of 
morality, especially given the fact that the Court has explicitly distinguished 
traditionalism from religious values as an independent basis for abortion 
regulation.212 Moreover, Tushnet explicitly recognized that independent secular 
grounds certainly existed to support the belief that a fetus is a person, much less a 
human being.213 
Beyond traditionalist values, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence 
accounts for the fact that religious motivations are inevitable in this context. It 
seems quite odd for the Court to recognize the state interest of using informed 
consent to show respect for fetal life while at the same time disqualifying the 
religious beliefs that may motivate a legislator to act according to that interest. The 
state interests recognized by the Supreme Court would ring hollow if this were the 
case. A court would never strike down anti-poverty legislation because of the 
religiously informed compassion held by a devout legislator for her constituents. 
Likewise, by ensuring that abortion provisions can be justified as representing 
traditionalist values rather than religious beliefs, the Court recognizes that religious 
motives are in some sense inevitable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has allowed states to assign real value to fetal life and to 
express that value in the context of informed consent through provisions that 
articulate a state’s preference for childbirth and its concern for the dignity of an 
unborn child. This regard for fetal life represents a secular state interest. Most 
importantly, this value need not remain groundless and unsubstantiated. States like 
South Dakota and Indiana do not exceed the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause doctrine by articulating the necessary premise underlying 
their regard for fetal life. This premise has remained implicit ever since Roe v. 
Wade: a fetus belongs to the species Homo sapiens. By allowing states to articulate 
a value for fetal life in the context of informed consent, the Supreme Court has 
necessarily implied that the premise for such a value need not remain unstated. 
The potentially religious motivations that may have inspired lawmakers to enact 
this previously uncodified premise do not taint the otherwise legitimate secular 
purpose. The Supreme Court in Harris has recognized that traditionalist values, not 
merely religious premises, may describe the basis of regulation that promotes 
childbirth over abortion. The Court’s statements in Harris would ring hollow if 
they did not also describe regulations that serve to articulate the foundational 
premise of much anti-abortion regulation. The uniqueness of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in setting forth these legitimate secular purposes forecloses an 
expansive application of McCreary’s objective observer analysis that might lead 
one to conclude that the motives of pro-life legislators are impermissibly religious. 
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Legislators are, therefore, free to act sincerely upon their religious motives in the 
abortion context, even to the extent of defining fetal life as a whole, separate, 
unique, and living human being. 
  
